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ESTIMATES AND ACTUALITY: COMPARATIVE COSTS OF
BRITISH CROSS-CHANNEL AIRLINES, 1918-1924
ROBIN HIGHAMt
The two articles that follow are published as an illus-
tration of the tremendous strides that have been made
in air transportation in the past forty-odd years.
Contrast, if you will, the absence of concrete data
and the extent of speculation detailed in Dr. Hig-
ham's article on the problems of the fledgling British
airlines' cross-channel operations, with the statistical
detail available to air carriers engaged in international
operations today as they plan for supersonic oper-
ations.
T IS not possible to be definitive about the costs of establishing British
overseas airlines for the simple reason that most of the early statistics
simply do not exist. Many were allowed to go by default, some companies'
accounts are not available or have been lost, and at least one company's rec-
ords were destroyed during World War II air raids. Only those belonging
to the Daimler Airway have been accessible. At the outset secrecy was re-
garded as essential. However, political reaction against Imperial Airways,
Ltd., in the latter nineteen thirties resulted in a clause in the British Over-
seas Airways (Corporation) Act of 1939 compelling the publication of
a full financial statement each year.
British overseas airline development was a natural outcome of the pre-war
enthusiasm of a devoted band of semi-professionals and of the immense
technological advances made during the course of World War I. Except
for the stunt Hendon-Windsor Coronation air mail service of 1911, which
made an operating profit of £1,460, there was no practical airline in
England until after the war. However, schemes, including a pre-war one
for a service to India via Constantinople, did appear.
The greatest difficulty faced by early companies was to find some data
upon which to base their estimates and some patrons who were willing
to loan risk capital. This was fully recognized by the distinguished com-
pany who sat on, or were co-opted to help with, the Civil Aerial Trans-
port Committee appointed in 1917. This Report (Cd. 9218) was full
of sound advice, based in part upon maritime experience, but none of the
experts ventured any concrete financial proposals. However, the Com-
mittee did recognize that the fate of civil aviation was intimately con-
cerned with that of the aircraft industry and almost as vitally with the
t University of North Carolina.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
R.A.F. Unfortunately, no precise advice could be given since so much
depended upon the naval, military and financial plans and commitments
of the government. The government, even more ignorant of aviation than
the Committee, did nothing. After civil flying had started, a committee
under Lord Weir of Eastwood reported on Imperial Air Routes (Cmd.
449). They proposed a charter company be established to operate a
service from Cairo to Karachi. Considerable government support in the
way of free gifts of war surplus materials and the establishment of aero-
dromes where the R.A.F. felt they were needed, was to be given with
additional monies for civil facilities as necessary. But again, no concrete
financial details were suggested. However, these were beginning to be
available during 1920.
One of the more enterprising of the early enthusiasts for aviation was
George Holt Thomas of THE GRAPHIC. Unlike so many other pioneers,
he had sufficient capital. Before the First World War he had acquired the
license to produce the French Farman aeroplanes in England. During the
conflict he manufactured non-rigid airships at one plant and aeroplanes
designed by Geoffrey de Havilland (DH) at his Aircraft Manufacturing
Company. In 1916 he moved a step further and founded a subsidiary,
Aircraft Transport and Travel, Ltd., commonly known as A.T. & T.
Because of the war, this company was unable to start operations until
late 1918, when it began a service to Belgium with R.A.F. aircraft flown
by service pilots. Along the side of the cockpit was painted, "Aircraft
Transport and Travel, Ltd., Folkestone-Ghent parcels service;" otherwise
the machines bore normal R.A.F. markings. This unusual situation, the
details of which have never been made public, was regularized in the
summer of 1919 when international flying was allowed after the Allies
had agreed to the International Convention for Aerial Navigation.
On 25 August 1919 Handley Page Transport joined A.T. & T. to
inaugurate British civil air services to the Continent. It, too, was an off-
shoot of an aircraft manufacturing concern. (In addition, H.P.T. was
involved with the Aircraft Disposals Company's war-surplus activities.)
Both companies operated to Paris and the Lowlands and were staffed with
enthusiastic personnel and a large and uncommercial collection of air-
craft. Both soon found themselves in severe financial difficulties. Since
the Handley Page records are not available and A.T. & T.'s were burned
in a World War II German raid on Birmingham, we know little of their
finances. This is not to say we know nothing at all.
In April 1920 General W. Sefton Brancker, who with General Festing
ran A.T. & T., lectured before the Royal Aeronautical Society in London.1
Though he did not reveal what his company's operating figures were, he
did indicate that their ground costs, excluding insurance but including
costs on the French side, amounted to about £45,000 per year. An exami-
'Brancker, Aerial Transport from a Business Point of View, XXIV, No. 114 J. of the
Royal Aeronautical Soc'y, 294-312 (1920). Table A is a paraphrase of Brancker's presentation with
my notes and percentages indicated by editorial brackets.
Some idea of the increased capital cost of running an airline today may be gathered from
the fact that a used Douglas DC-3, a 1936 design, cost £19,000 (c. $54,000 in 1959), while
a new Fokker-Fairchild Friendship as supplied to Piedmont Airlines as a replacement for the
DC-3 costs about $735,000. The DH 34 cost £10,000, the Armstrong-Whitworth Argosy of
1926-35 £33,000, and the Short Empire flying-boats of 1936-45 £59,000 plus. These increased
costs had a direct effect on the capital necessary. Brancker proposed £140,000 in 1920. By 1939
this had risen to £10,000,000, for B.O.A.C. with its world-wide commitments and need for more
than 50 four-engined aircraft.
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nation of the following table (Table A) indicates that his figures for a
hypothetical company were probably about what A.T. & T. was actually
operating on, but without having fourteen identical aircraft, which for
these figures were to have been DH 18's. In other words, the proposals
Brancker presented were probably the ones upon which the future of




Cost of London-Paris Air Service
14 aeroplanes, including reserves & spares at £6,500 each £91,000
Spare engines £10,000
Other spares £20,000
Transport, tools, etc. £9,000
Working capital £10,000
Total £140,000
Each of the 14 aeroplanes utilized 300 hours per year with six
trips each way daily scheduled between London and Paris.
With an average of 280 flying days per year, this equals
1,680 trips or 4,200 hours.
Fuel for 4,200 hours at £5 per hour £21,000 [14%]
Depreciation at 50% including obsolescence £45,500 [31%]
Insurance at 20% [of value of the aircraft] £18,200 [12%]
Pilots' bonus at 10/-per hour £2,100
Total £86,800
Total Charges (admittedly on high side)
without interest on capital, per year £ 131,800
with 10% interest on capital, per year £145,800[100%]
Cost per trip with one ton of freight at
100 m.p.h. over 250 miles £78.1 0.0d
At £15.15.0d each for a full load of
passengers, per year revenue £211,680
At 2/-per pound of freight at full load
of one ton, per year revenue £376,320
For a mixed load, say, per year, or
£175 per trip with full load. £300,000
The above revenue figures presume a full load, or 6,720 passengers per year and
840 tons of goods. Admittedly impossible. Breakeven point per trip is 2.8
passengers and 784 pounds of freight, or 9 passengers and 2,500 pounds of
freight a day.
[N.B. In 1924 Imperial Airways estimated a London-Paris service of 1,484 trips
with 8,122 passengers on a load factor of 4 persons in the 8 passenger DH 34.
This was then expected to produce a revenue of £39,049. In 1922/23 Handley Page
Transport had a revenue on this route of £33,971 for only two-thirds the mileage,
subsidy excluded.] [The above table is a paraphrase from the materials presented
to the Royal Aeronautical Society.]
Brancker's figures when compared on a percentage basis with those of
Imperial Airways for its world-wide operations in the period 1932-37
(for which see Table F below), show that his fuel estimates were lower,
but he was operating single-engined aircraft. His depreciation figure is
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extremely high at 31%, but he was amortizing the aircraft in two years,
whereas later custom was to take four or five. Brancker's practice however
was not out of line with war-time experience where the erosion of aircraft
was 60% per month due to enemy action, lack of training, and flying
accidents. In addition the "crates" A.T. & T. was using were not as
durable as later machines specially built for commercial use. Moreover,
insurance costs were very high in the early days owing to lack of actuarial
materials and the inexperience with air transport of all concerned.
Some interesting comments on Brancker's operational ideas appeared two
years later when Col. Frank Searle also spoke to the Royal Aeronautical
Society. Searle had been the guiding hand of the London General Omnibus
Company and then of Daimler Hire, the deluxe English car rental agency.
When the Birmingham Small Arms (B.S.A.) group, which owned the
Daimler motor car company, bought Holt Thomas's Aircraft Manufactur-
ing Company, it sent Searle to investigate and then to manage A.T. & T.
He told the Society that in the Fall of 1920 he found the airline had
some twenty-five aircraft, of which scarcely two were identical, valued
at £50,000.2 In addition an order had been placed for £60,000 worth of
DH 18's. The latter was a brand-new type properly conceived as a civil
airliner and intended as a replacement for all the old war-surplus material.
Brancker was outraged when Searle cancelled the order for these machines,
which were, after all, necessary. But, as Searle quite properly noted,
Brancker could if he wanted junk the twenty-five relics (and certainly do
away with some of the miniature Air Ministry running them), but he
could not as cavalierly erase the £50,000 from the books.'
The Instone Airline was almost an accidental creation. The firm of
S. Instone and Company ran collieries and owned and chartered ships to
take their coal to France. In 1918-1919 they found that the mails were
2 Types of Aircraft in Use by British Air Transport Companies, 1919-1924.
Type Aircraft Trans- Handley Page The Instone Daimler Grand
port and Travel Transport Air Line Airway Total
DH 4 4 2 1 7
DH 9 9 8 17
DH 16 8 8
DH 18 3 (to Instone) 1 5 1 6
DH 34 4 (one to-) 6 9
HP 0/400 10 10
HP 0/10 8 8
HP 0/11 5 5
HP W8 1 1
HP W8b 3 3
Bristol Fighter 2 2
Bristol 10-seater 1 1
Bristol Tourer 1 I
Vickers Vimy Commercial 1 1
Vickers Vulcan 3 (2 returned to V's) 3
B.A.T. FK26 1 1
Westland Limousine 2 2
Supermarine Sea Eagle 2 (British Marine Air
Navigation Co.) 2
18 types 24/4 types 41/10 types 18/8 types 7/2 types 87
N.B. Not all of the aircraft registered by Handley Page Transport were used for airline service.
The DH 18's were owned by the Air Ministry and shuffled around amongst the lines, which
is why the right-hand totals do not agree with some horizontal totals.
Source: Lists compiled by L. T. Mason of the Air Registration Board of London for use in my
book Britain's Imperial Air Routes, 1918-1939, (Hamden, Conn., 1961).
'Searle, The Requirements and Difficulties of Air Transport, XXVI, No. 133 J. of the
Royal Aeronautical Soc'y, 3-22 (1922).
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so slow that they were paying excessive demurrage charges because their
colliers arrived in France before the necessary papers. To rectify this
situation they obtained a DH 4a and pilot from the Air Ministry. Soon
they expanded their service and began to carry passengers and freight.
It was only in the last year of operations that the airline side of the busi-
ness was registered as a private company. No records have so far come
to light, so no financial figures are available except those reported for
subsidiary purposes. According to these, despite a government subsidy
of £44,100 for the year 9 March 1921-31 March 1922, the Instone Air
Line lost £5,398.' But what Sir Samuel Instone pointed out at one of the
Air Conferences was no doubt true, that not one of the companies would
have shown a profit if proper allowances for depreciation, etc., were made.'
In the fall of 1920 the first of three Air Conferences was held in
London.! The initial meeting is of particular interest because its Report
contains the estimates of H. White-Smith, who had been on the 1918
C.A.T. Committee, for a London-Paris air service with six identical air-
craft of each of the twelve types then available for civil use. These figures
(given in Table B below) were not applicable to the airlines of that
moment for not one of them operated a matched set of planes. But
White-Smith's prognostications may be compared with the actual opera-
tional accounts of the Daimler Airway (see Tables C and D below) which
did own six identical aircraft for the two years 1922-1924. Though the
original table contained twelve types, for simplicity only those types
which went into regular airline operation are included here. Of these, the
DH 9 was converted from a two-seat day-bomber, the Handley Page
0/400 was a late model heavy bomber, the Vickers Vimy Commercial
was the basic heavy bomber with a large plywood monocoque fuselage.
Only the DH 18 and the Handley Page W8 were initiated as commercial
designs.
'Sykes, From Many Angles 294, (London, 1943).
5cmd. 1157, 21-23.
'Reported verbatim in Cmd. 1157. The other two Conferences are covered by Cmd. 1619
and Cmrd. 1848.
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Chief Pilot or Traffic Manager £600 same
Navigation Controller 500 /
Business Manager & Accountant 500
Foreign aerodrome manager 500
2 Customs clerks 400
2 Typists (home) 300
2 Typists (abroad) 200
2 Accounting clerks 450
1 General Clerk 150
£3,600 £3,600
Advertising 5,000 5,000
Rent at Terminal 1,500 2,500
Transport for maintenance works 1,000 1,000
Insurance of buildings and men 100 180
Insurance of 8 pilots 160 320
Depreciation of plant at 10% 200 300
Office expenses 600 600
Contingencies, including salvage of aircraft, etc. 2,000 3,000
Administrative expenses 1,000 4,000
Grand Total £18,160 £20,500
In the Table B the most significant percentage figures are those which show the
contrast between war-surplus aeroplanes and those designed for commercial service.
Thus it is seen that the operating costs for the DH 18 are considerably better
than for the DH 9 with but one quarter the capacity. There is a steady progressive
improvement from the bober-conversion HP 0/400 to the HP W8 commercial
design with the commercialized Vimy bomber a fairly good runner up. Insurance
and depreciation both increase more rapidly for the commercial designs owing to
greater initial cost, but this is compensated for by the greater efficiency and
longevity of these designs. Such a comparative study as this was not readily avail-
able in the interwar years owing to natural business secrecy and reluctance to
see what might be detrimental comparisons, but is today becoming increasingly
common.
In the above table the contrast between the cost of operating the DH 9
and the DH 18 is noteworthy. Despite the fact that the price of the
DH 18 was six times the DH 9 and the capital outlay three-and-a-half
times as much, the operating cost was slightly less than doubled while the
capacity was quadrupled. The DH 34 cost about £10,000 maximum. The
Daimler Airway was able to hire-purchase these machines, it is true, but
nevertheless it operated with only four to six of them and made a good
showing with an original capital of only £30,000.
Before comparing White-Smith's estimates with our control, the Daimler
Airway, whose monthly accounts survive, something must be said about
government aid to the airlines.
. Despite stress laid by advisory bodies on the importance of govern-
mental assistance to both the airline and the aircraft industry, in the
first two post-war years the British government took the attitude that
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the airlines must fly by themselves.! The French, however, heavily sub-
sidized their operators in the interests of national defense. The result was
that French fare-cutting forced the virtual cessation of all British airline
operations, while the British government maintained facilities for French
operators! The crisis was reached in February-March 1921. Winston
Churchill, then Secretary of State for Colonies and Air, appointed the
emergency Cross-Channel Subsidies Committee. This body immediately
recommended a "temporary scheme" to aid Handley Page Transport and
the Instone Air Line (A.T. & T. was then being liquidated.) to get back
in the air. Each company was to be granted £25,000 for operations from
March through October. The scheme was subsequently extended to the
end of March 1922 s with an additional grant of £19,100 for each com-
pany. In other words, the government was forced to do virtually what
the Weir Committee (Cmd. 770) had recommended in April 1920. While
the "temporary scheme" was in force, the Air Ministry asked for other
operators' proposals. In September 1921 the Ministry approved those
submitted by the Daimler Airway. Thus the "permanent scheme" pro-
vided for operations by three British companies.
Under the "permanent scheme" the Air Ministry not only paid a
subsidy on the basis of 25 % of gross revenues for carriage of passengers,
freight and mails, but also supplied 50% of the total fleet on a hire-
purchase basis and paid half of the premiums for insurance up to 10%
of the value of the material. If net profits, including subsidies, exceeded
15 % of the total subscribed cash capital, then the balance in excess was
to be refunded to the Air Ministry until the whole of the subsidy was
repaid. In practice, of course, this latter provision proved utterly unreal.
It should also be noted that the Air Ministry made at this time no attempt
to divide up the routes, but allowed all three companies to compete on
the lucrative London-Paris run. This, as the Hambling Committee of
1923 (Cmd. 1811) so correctly pointed out, meant that the Air Ministry
was competing against itself as well as against the French.
Since the above arrangement did not prove satisfactory, in the fall
of 1922 a "revised scheme" came into operation. This required the lines
to fulfill certain minimum operating conditions, introducing fines for
nonfulfillment. It also provided for the free gift to the companies of all
the material purchased for them by the Air Ministry up to 31 March
1923. In addition, the routes were redistributed so that Handley Page
monopolized London-Paris, Instone's London-Brussels-Cologne, and Daim-
ler Manchester-London-Amsterdam-Berlin. But before the companies were
allowed to gain full experience with this arrangement, the Hambling
Committee met and the government decided on a new program.
The final cost of the subsidies' schemes to the cessation of competitive
operations on 31 March 1924, including financial aid to the De Havilland
Air Taxi service for experimental air mail operations in the United
'Winston Churchill in introducing the Air Estimates on 3 March 1920 referred briefly to
the civil airlines in this respect and the sentence became one of the key dictums of British
aviation policy. (See 126 H. C. Debs., 5 s., 1622, (11 March 1920).)
'The original agreement was Cmd. 1521; the scheme is summarized in Cmd. 1811, one of
the essential documents of British aeronautical history.
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Kingdom, was £313,824.9 Thus, despite the Churchillian dictum that the
airlines would have to fly by themselves, the government did have to boost
the airlines into the black.
The Daimler Airway was established by Col. Frank Searle of Daimler
Hire and Maj. George Woods Humphery, who had managed Handley
Page Transport in its early days and was by training an engineer and by
experience a pilot. Unable to raise the £30,000 capital they considered
necessary from private individuals, they persuaded the Daimler Company
to advance the necessary funds. It proved to be a good investment, for
not only did Daimler get its money back in 1924, but, according to Mr.
Woods Humphery, it made in all a 50% return on its investment."
The Daimler Airway was Searle's chance to put into airline practice
ideas he had acquired in the adolescent omnibus business. The result was
that this company had an influence far beyond its short two-year career.
It was assumed that the company could not afford to operate with a large
number of idle machines and personnel. Searle stipulated that every air-
craft must fly 1,000 hours a year to earn its keep. (Woods Humphery
raised this to 2,000 for Imperial Airways.) Every operation was carefully
analysed and personnel was cut to the minimum. One of the immediate
and most important results of this scrutiny was that Daimler began to fly
a round trip with the same aircraft every day on the London-Paris run,
and later this was doubled. Heretofore a 'plane was flown over to Paris
one day and back to London the next. With this system of intensive
usage, Daimler never used more than four aircraft. (When Woods
Humphery managed Imperial Airways (1924-1938), he was frequently
short of aircraft, but the company just could not afford to keep a number
of £30,000-£60,000 machines in hangars around the world in case of
emergency. It was not until just before the creation of B.O.A.C. in 1939
that risk capital became available in large enough amounts to allow con-
templation of such a luxury.) If Daimler flew its aircraft hard, it also
'Subsidies to British Airlines, 1921-1924, in pounds sterling.
1921-22 1922-23 1923-24 1924-25
Daimler - 39,304 54,936 1,854
Handley Page 37,150 34,169 20,822 2,331
Instone's 38,475 45,818 32,363 2,578
British Marine Air Navigation ---- 3,846 178
Total of above 75,625 119,291 111,967 6,941
DH. Plymouth-Belfast mail --- --- 1,672 50
Cost of aircraft for above
except DeHavilland (DH). 62,461 2,566
These figures include the final payments made in settlement after audit of the books in 1924.
In the first five years of operations, the five British companies received a total of £378,851 in
subsidies and gifts of which £65,027 was in equipment. Not included in these figures are those
applicable to the De Havilland Taxi service amounting to £1,722. Although there were five
major companies from 1919 to 1924, Aircraft Transport and Travel died before receiving any
Government aid.
The total subsidies to each of the four remaining companies amounted to:
Daimler Airway £ 96,094
Handley Page Transport £ 94,472
The Instone Air Line £119,234
British Marine Air Navigation Co. £ 4,024
Total £313,824
Source: 204 H. C. Deb. 5 s., 1429 (31 March 1927).
t0 Conversations and correspondence with Mr. Woods-Humphrey, who has hyphenated his
name since becoming a resident of the United States.
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employed its pilots with equal vigor, but paid them well, too. A typical
Daimler day would show this sort of distribution of its DH 34's: G-EBBX
London-Amsterdam, G-EBBY Amsterdam-London, G-EBBS Manchester-
London, G-EBBQ London-Cologne. The company did not go in for
freight on the Berlin route because it claimed that it could not afford to
be unable to handle passengers, while the subsidy actually made it a
paying proposition to operate without any passengers at all on this long-
haul introduced in 1923.
A study of the monthly passengers-carried figures for Daimler indi-
cates that the business was seasonal to such an extent that it varied be-
tween a total of 640 passengers in August 1923 down to less than ten in
January 1924. The periodic fluctuations are reflected in the reasoning of
both Brancker in 1920 and Woods Humphery and Searle in 1924. The
causes for this were not only the usual vacation and holiday impulses,
but that during the summer months many Americans visiting Europe
flew the cross-Channel services for the experience. This held true down
to 1929.
This periodic change is not unique with these early British lines. Start-
ing in 1958 Pan-American World Airways and National Airlines made
use of varying patterns of seasonal vacation-seekers to economize on the
use of jets. National leases Pan-American equipment for its Florida services
during the off-season on North Atlantic travel.
Of the seven aircraft which at one time or another carried Daimler
registration four crashed and three survived to be turned over to Imperial
Airways on 1 April 1924, and one of these crashed the following Decem-
ber. Of the original seven, four were on loan from the Air Council and
were part of the free gift of the "revised scheme."
TABLE C
Daimler Airway monthly profit and loss account in pounds sterling.
Month 1922-23 1923-24
April -4651-16s 202- 3s
May -4043-13s -46-11s
June -7869-18s -152-16s
July -2722-12s -556- 4s
August -2073-12s 19
September -1996- 2s -149- 5s
October 542- 5s -555- 7s
November 322-17s 331- 5s




Fiscal 1922-23 resulted in a net loss of £20,303-7s for the year.
Fiscal 1923-24 showed a net profit for the year of £2,980-12s.
These figures allowed for depreciation and a ten percent profit, so the net operat-
ing loss of £17,322-15s for the two years is not quite a true picture of Daimler
finances.
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TABLE D
Daimler Airway's annual receipts and expenditures for the company's own fiscal
year, 1 November 1922 - 31 October 1923. During this period the company
operated no more than six DH 34's and generally only four.
Annual Costs** Receipts
Stores consumed £17,545-12s Passengers £8,509- 2s
Wages 6,524-11s Freight &
Salaries 4,122 mail 2,078-14s
Pilots' bonuses 2,640-1 is Government
Advertising 5,007-14s aid* 60,106- 2s
Car Hire 2,799-12s Miscellaneous 565- 2s
Insurance 9,354- 9s Total receipts £71,539.
Interest to Daimler
Hire, Ltd. 2,871-19s
Bad debts 537-17s *This item included £651-3s for the
Profit for year 7,171- 3s repair of engines received from the
Total of all costs £71,539. Air Ministry.
**See Table F for percentages.
Source for Table C and D: Monthly accounts of the Daimler Airway kindly lent by the
Secretary, Daimler Hire, Ltd., London. (A microfilm copy is now in the Baker Library,
Harvard University.)
Comparison of the Daimler finances with those of earlier companies
reveals the difficulties confronting the earlier operators. Not only were
they faced with insufficient data, but they were too often militarily-
minded in their assessments of what was needed. It is an old Service
custom to order considerably in excess of one's needs in order to be sure
of obtaining enough. Until the early nineteen thirties, risk capital was
just not interested in airlines, let alone willing to squander money on them.
Thus the Daimler operation prospered for two reasons apart from its
natural efficiency; it was small in concept and it obtained its capital from
a large parent corporation, not itself engaged in manufacturing aero-
planes which it expected its subsidiary to purchase. Thus it was free to
buy the most suitable machines. Next to Daimler, the Instone Air Line
had the soundest base. It was managed by the colliery-shipping company
run by the family and obtained its capital from that outfit. Both Handley
Page Transport and Aircraft Transport and Travel suffered from being
subsidiaries of other aircraft businesses.
The nearest comparable aircraft in the Cmd. 1157 estimates to Daimler's
DH 34's was the DH 18, its elder sister. Both aircraft were designed for
commercial service by Geoffrey de Havilland of jet-engined Comet fame.
The DH 34 cost £10,000 while the DH 18 was priced at £6,500. The
operating budget of the Daimler Airway was £71,539 including an al-
lowed 10% profit for the parent company, while that for the DH 18 was
£100,469. The capital costs are not quite comparable for Daimler re-
ceived three of its aircraft as free gifts from the Air Ministry (one was
always owned by the company) after they had only been partially paid
for. Nevertheless, the £30,000 capital was considerably less than the
£72,290 for the DH 18, though this was probably due to the hire-
purchase scheme in force in 1921-22.
Almost as soon as he became Air Minister in the new Conservative
government in the Fall of 1922, Sir Samuel Hoare appointed a committee
under Sir Herbert Hambling to advise him on an airlines program.
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Their Report (Cmd. 1811) is one of the landmarks of British air trans-
port history. After carefully reviewing the history of government-airline
relations, the Committee recommended drastic changes. Primarily it was
concerned that the hand-to-mouth schemes be abandoned in favor of a
million-pound monopoly company with a guaranteed subsidy for ten
years. The reasoning behind this proposal, which was made by business-
men and not by airmen, was that the only way to attract private capital
and at the same time give Britain a proper and stable airline organization
was to provide that security of position and subsidy which would allow
for planning and development to enable the company to fly by itself at
the end of the stipulated period. The committee also made it plain that
the proposed monopoly should be operated as a purely commercial enter-
prise, hoping that the regular payment of dividends would draw in share
capital for future development.
The government accepted these proposals and asked for tenders. The
Instone family submitted one plan and the other three companies (Hand-
ley Page Transport, the Daimler Airway, and the recently-formed British
Marine Air Navigation Company) another. In the end the Instones were
forced to join the others and in December 1923 the Air Ministry and the
British Foreign and Colonial Corporation signed an agreement for an
Imperial air transport company (Cmd. 2010).
The arrangements made by the British Foreign and Colonial Corpora-
tion bore fruit with the creation of Imperial Airways, Ltd., in March.
It was managed by Col. Searle and Mr. Woods Humphery, though Searle
left after clashing with Sir Eric Geddes, the Chairman. For fourteen of
its fifteen and a half years the company was in the hands of "WH." The
older companies were bought out by means of cash payments and shares
in the new company."
A document survives from the pre-operating days of Imperial Airways
which gives a good idea of how the company planned its operations and
what it cost the older companies for theirs.' Sticking to the London-
Paris figurings, we find that the new company estimated 1,484 single trips
per year divided as follows:
162 trips with 648 passengers in the winter months of November
through February,
458 trips with 2,290 passengers in the intermediate months of
September, October, March and April,
864 trips in the summer with 5,184 passengers.
It was estimated that this would amount to 326,480 miles a year at
3/2.31d per service mile for a cost of £52,115. Revenue was expected
to amount to only £39,049; therefore, the subsidy for this route had
to be £13,066. Estimated revenue was figured as 8,122 passengers at £5
apiece totalling £40,610, less agents commission of 10% (£4,061) and
" The four older companies received a total of £148,750 in cash and paid-up shares in
Imperial Airways as follows:
Handley Page £51,500 (£17,166 and 34,334 shares)
Instones £46,000 (£15,333 and 30,677 shares)
Daimler £30,000 (£10,000 and 20,000 shares)
B.M.A.N.C. £21,250 (£ 7,083 and 14,167 shares)
'" Since all the estimates were based on the use of DH 34's and the schedules from which
these figures were taken came from Daimler Hire, it is presumed that this document was the
work of Searle and Woods Humphrey in March 1924.
See Tables E and F.
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car hire of £2,500. However, it was expected that £5,000 would accrue
from freight and excess baggage charges; thus bringing the total revenue
to the £39,049 figure given above.
TABLE E
Schedule 22. Estimated costs, mileage, and receipts for 1924 with actual workings
of the companies, 1922-1923.
Channel
Hamburg- Islands
Paris Cologne Berlin Flying TOTAL
old mileage 207,920 268,258 63,733 (14.8.23- 539,911
30.11.23)
new mileage 326,480 345,960 170,269 103,490 946,199
old cost £59,447 £54,911 £13,572 £127,930
proposed £52,115 £55,223 £27,179 £16,519 £151,036
Total net receipts
old £33,971 £19,042 £ 1,269 £54,282
estimated £39,049 £32,470 £ 2,032 f 3,364 £76,915
Net passenger receipts
previous £30,055 £11,148 £ 1,269 £42,472
estimated £34,049 £14,470 £ 2,032 3,364 £53,915
Freight Receipts
previous £ 3,916 £ 7,370 negligible unknown £11,286
estimated £ 5,000 £18,000 £23,000
Note 1. The Budget of £1 59,268 is based on 1,000,000 service miles. The above
routes account for 946,199 miles at a cost of £151,036. The balance of mileage
to be allocated to routes according to needs.
Note 2. Insurance provided for at rate of 3d per mile on 1,000,000 miles -
£12,500. It may be advisable to increase this to 4d to build up a reserve in
the early years.
Note 3. An allowance has been made in the Budget for petrol and oil for use
of the HP W8's on 200,000 miles. No addition has been made for extra main-
tenance. [see services estimates]
Note 4. Dead mileage is taken at 3% of service mileage; 30,000 miles at 1/5 1/2d
cost per mile (excluding petrol, oil, maintenance and absolescence already pro-
vided for). Therefore take £2,131 from the estimated surplus.
On the other routes to be operated, the company figured that the
London-Cologne route would cost £55,223 a year for 610 trips with 3,050
passengers necessitating a subsidy of £22,753. The London-Amsterdam-
Hamburg-Berlin line was expected to carry only 640 passengers in 253
trips and to require a subsidy of £25,147 a year to offset operating costs
of £27,179. (No wonder Daimler said that it really did not matter
too much whether they carried passengers or not on this run.) The
Channel Islands service was only run from August to November 1923,
but on the results of these operations it was predicted that revenues
would be only £3,364 versus operating expenses of £16,519, calling for
a subsidy of £13,155.
For operating from London to Paris, Basle and Zurich, to Brussels and
Cologne, and to Amsterdam, Hamburg and Berlin Imperial Airways was
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to receive a subsidy of £137,000 per year. In 1928 it was sensibly decided
that competition in Europe with surface transport was too great for
profitable unsubsidized operations, and the main emphasis was shifted to
Empire routes. In 1936 British Airways came into being as a rival sub-
sidized company in Europe. However not all of the routes there were,
for reasons never satisfactorily explained, turned over to this company.
B.O.A.C. was created in 1939 and had not yet taken over when war
nationalized both lines. Since 1946 Continental routes have been the
sphere of British European Airways operations.
Perhaps the most important point in early airline operation, well made
by the Daimler management, was that both personnel and equipment
must be utilized to the maximum. At the same time emphasis was placed
upon standardization. When the same management took over Imperial
Airways it had the opportunity to extend its practice. This resulted in the
establishment by 1937 of a fairly standard distribution of costs between
the various items of expenditure for operations. These figures have been
used as a control. Table G places them against the percentages of Daimler
Airways' operations for 1922-23, Instones' prognastications for 1924-5,
and Imperial Airways' own plans for 1924-5. In the latter case, the
management had the advantage of access to the operating figures of all
the British lines and was able to effect some economies by a new centrali-
zation of maintenance and staff. By the end of 1937 the annuation of
pilots and the increasing costs of modern equipment had caused some
adjustment in the original percentages. More tellingly, the Air Ministry
turned the company's efficiency against it in drawing up contracts for
the carriage of mail and for subsidies. Nevertheless, Imperial Airways
averaged dividends of 4/2% for the sixteen years of its existence.
TABLE F
Control percentages.
Imperial Airways percentage distribution of costs based on five years of opera-
tions from 1932 through 1937 in comparison with the same percentages taken
from Daimler Airway accounts for the year 1 November 1922 - 31 October
1923. These figures should be compared with the percentages inserted in Tables
A and B. Imperial Airways' 1924 plans covered only existing European routes.
In the case of these two airlines, they both operated relatively homogeneous fleets.
Daimler's consisted almost exclusively of DH 34's, while of Imperial Airways'
fleet during the five-year period, the majority of the aircraft were fitted with the
same engines, obsolescent aircraft were used for development work, and centrali-
zation of operations at London and Cairo considerably reduced overhead. It
should also be borne in mind that the company operated over routes from
London to Australia with approximately the same route mileage in Europe as
that operated by the pre-1924 companies. During the period in question, Imperial
Airways received an average of 32% of its revenue from government sub-
sidies. During the year under consideration for Daimler Airways the subsidy
amounted to 831% of the revenue received. The Instone Air Line submitted
proposals in May 1923 for a £1,000,000 operating company which would be
granted monopoly privileges by the Air Ministry. The Instone estimates provided
in the first year for maintenance of the existing services in Europe. Therefore
their figures for the first year may be taken to reflect fairly accurately their
operating experience, both as airline and shipping people.









Salaries and wages 18.4% 12.5% 15% 22%
Fuel and oil 24.5 21.6 21 18
Materials used on
maintenance & repairs 7.2 23 7
Replacement of flying
stock and equipment 7 14.4 11 14
[Depreciation]
Rents, subcontracted
services and insurance 13 4.6 12.7 17
Advertising 6.9 4 5 4
Ground transportation of
passengers and their
accommodation 3.9 1.6 [5]? 6
Agents' commissions U/K 1.6 U/K 2
United Kingdom income tax N/A? N/A? N/A? 1
Development expenditure U/K U/K U/K 2
Dividends 10 (profit) 21.5 2
General Reserves U/K U/K 2.8 5
Technical efficiency may be judged from the changing ratios of fuel
and oil to other costs. The 3 % drop in this item is significant because
operational aircraft increased in size and number of engines. In this
respect it should be noted that the real technical breakthrough came in the
early nineteen thirties with the introduction of constant-speed propellers,
retractable undercarriages and the abandonment of the biplane configura-
tion. Conversely, though the size of the crew remained unchanged, except
on long-distance flights, in the inter-war years, increasing experience and
service called for higher pay scales. By 1937 Imperial Airways had recog-
nized this to the extent of introducing new pay rates for incoming air-
crew. This had much the same effect in 1937-38 as the disputes over
jet-age crewing have had in America.
The cost of insurance declined relatively over the years, but the in-
creased cost of new models generally negated the savings. This had its
effect on depreciation, too. The £10,000 DH 34 had to be replaced with
the £33,000 Argosy, and ten years later the Ensigns for European service
cost £53,000 apiece.
When the relative ignorance of the pioneers is taken into account, it
appears marvelous that their "guesstimates" of revenues and expenses were
not farther off the mark. The Instone accounts might well reveal them to
have been just as astute businessmen as the Searle-Woods Humphery
combination at Daimler, but the Instone Air Line never operated so well
with so few machines. Handley Page Transport's operations will probably
always remain an enigma for its affairs were complicated by association
with world-wide ambitions and the war-surplus business. A. T. & T. is
known to have been liquidated for reasons beyond its control, but its
early operations were admittedly in the red. Even Imperial Airways with
£1,000,000 capital at its disposal only received a truly commercial air-
craft when the Handley Page Heracles HP 42/43 class were delivered
in 1931.
The significance of this is seen in the figures for load factors in the
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period 1919-24 in contrast with those of Imperial Airways, 1924-1940.
In the first instance 31,870 passengers were carried for a load factor of
59%, while in the latter 575,900 were carried for a 67.7% factor. 3
The early British Cross-Channel airlines were in many ways like the
pioneer steamship operators; they were in the field of the future; but
they were ahead of technology. Not only the French and their subsidies,
the British government's self-supporting laissez-faire policy, but also
economic factors themselves were against unsupported success. Even Daim-
ler was able to show only a respectable profit owing to heavy financial
aid from the government.
Speed has always cost money. Up to about 1928-30 several of the
most influential people in British aeronautical circles thought in terms
of making civil aviation self-supporting through the development of
efficient 100 m.p.h. aircraft which would provide a just sufficient ad-
vantage in speed to make the airline an effective competitor with the
railroads. Hence the interest in large rigid airships with their low maxi-
mum speed. The breakthrough of the early nineteen thirties and then the
revolution created by the gas turbine were impelled by pressagentry and
prestigial powers. These have made such speed appear mandatory that
no airline which is forced to succumb to the mania will fly without a
tax-assisted take-off. Therefore, our hats may be taken off to the British
pioneers who tried to make air travel a reasonable form of transportation.14
13 Masefield, Some Economic Factors in Air Transport Operation, J. of the Institute of
Transport 79-108 (1951).
14The late Eric Birkhead and I talked in London in the summer of 1959 of the articles
we were then writing on this topic. His "The Financial Failure of British Air Transport Compa-
nies, 1919-1924" appeared in IV, J. of Transport History, 133-145 (May 1960). Mine was un-
avoidably delayed by publishing difficulties and is presented as complimentary to his work which was
cut short by an unexpectedly early death.
